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Abstract
The idea is advanced that self-organization in complex systems can be treated as deci-
sion making (as it is performed by humans) and, vice versa, decision making is nothing but
a kind of self-organization in the decision maker nervous systems. A mathematical formu-
lation is suggested based on the definition of probabilities of system states, whose partic-
ular cases characterize the probabilities of structures, patterns, scenarios, or prospects. In
this general framework, it is shown that the mathematical structures of self-organization
and of decision making are identical. This makes it clear how self-organization can be
seen as an endogenous decision making process and, reciprocally, decision making occurs
via an endogenous self-organization. The approach is illustrated by phase transitions in
large statistical systems, crossovers in small statistical systems, evolutions and revolu-
tions in social and biological systems, structural self-organization in dynamical systems,
and by the probabilistic formulation of classical and behavioral decision theories. In all
these cases, self-organization is described as the process of evaluating the probabilities
of macroscopic states or prospects in the search for a state with the largest probability.
The general way of deriving the probability measure for classical systems is the principle
of minimal information, that is, the conditional entropy maximization under given con-
straints. Behavioral biases of decision makers can be characterized in the same way as
analogous to quantum fluctuations in natural systems.
Keywords: self-organization; complex systems; decision theory; probabilistic scenarios;
behavioral biases
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1 Introduction
In order to avoid misunderstanding, we would like to stress from the very beginning that
the main idea and the principal novelty of the present article is the demonstration that self-
organization of complex systems can be described in precisely the same mathematical terms as
decision making by human beings. In that sense, these two, to the first glance, absolutely
different processes, can be understood as different representations of the same phenomenon.
To realize this demonstration, we resort to the optimization methods based on conditional
maximization of entropy, or minimization of an information functional. However, one has to
keep in mind that the optimization methods, as such, are not the goal but are the tools for
accomplishing the demonstration of the equivalence of self-organization and decision making.
Before plunging into the mathematical formulation, we give in this introduction below the
general feeling of the problem, which should help the reader to grasp the main ideas that will
be mathematically proved in the following sections.
The universe is marvelously structured. Everywhere and at any scale one examines, one
cannot escape a deep sense of wonder about the origin and meaning of the remarkable organi-
zations that can be observed, exhibiting complex interplays between regularity and irregularity,
order and disorder, periodicity and stochasticity, aesthetics and randomness. Confronted with
these impressions, a first reaction is to invoke the presence of a superior being, whose will has
determined the “natural order of things” and who is in charge with its maintenance. In the
standard teleological or “intelligent design” argument (McPherson 1972), it is pointed out that
the delicate and harmonious work of a clock requires the expert agency of a watchmaker. Then,
by analogy, the organization of the universe mentioned above cannot be conceived without the
existence, will and agency of a super-watchmaker. This argument that design implies a designer
(Aquinas 13th century, Paley, 1802) is permeating in one or another form all types of religious
beliefs that have appeared over the history of humanity, perhaps as far as 200 000 years ago
(Dunbar 2006), in the search for meanings and the quest for permanence.
Many thinkers and scientists have contributed to the rebuttal of the intelligent design argu-
ment. On pure logical grounds, the proposition that a designer creates by definition a design,
which has some structure, does not reverse logically into the proposition that a structure is
necessary by design, and thus requires a designer. Indeed, this would amount to assuming
incorrectly the equivalence of A → B and B → A. Here A is the proposition of the existence
of designer and B is the property of a system to possess structure. The incarnation of the fact
that, if A→ B holds true, this does not imply the validity of B → A, is found in the concept of
self-organization and of emergence, namely that novel organized behaviors emerge from sponta-
neous collective organization. The scientific theory of self-organization has matured in science
over most of the 20th century in different disciplines. The ubiquity of self-organization has
made irrelevant (or better said, unnecessary and non-parsimonious) the concept of a top-down
design (and of control) by a super-being (Kauffman 1996). In contrast, we now understand
that spontaneous bottom-up self-organizations occur generically and provide the mechanisms
and the construction processes for explaining most, if not all, phenomena of the Universe.
Self-organization can be defined as the spontaneous formation in a complex system of global
structures out of local interactions (Haken 2005; Heylighen 2009). By global structures is meant
spatial, temporal, or functional structures involving the system as a whole. Examples of such
ubiquitous structures has been the objects of numerous studies in the physical and biological
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sciences (Glansdorff and Prigogin 1971; Haken 1983; Nicolis 1986) and in cybernetics (Ashby
1947; von Foerster 1960, 1999; von Foerster and Pask 1960; Wiener 1961; von Glasserfeld 1996;
Labini et al. 2009) as well as, to a lesser degree, in social sciences (Schelling 1978; Krugman
1996; Brock and Hommes 1997; Galam 2012). More recently, great attention is being paid to
the processes of self-organization in various networks, including neuron networks in the brain
(Mainzer 2007; Chialvo 2010; Werner 2012; Fingelkurts et al. 2012) and of self-organization
of various swarms and flocks (Vanni et al. 2011; Turalska et al 2011), where self-organization
is understood as the unexpected appearance of collective or coherent behavior that is termed
swarm intelligence. Complex behaviors of simple physical systems, imitating a kind of trivial
intelligence, can be due to entropic forces (Wissner-Gross and Freer 2013).
The goal of the present article is to suggest a novel level of understanding, combining
self-organization of the complex system and decision making of that same complex system
(without invoking the will and decision making of any controller or watchmaker). This is based
on the recognition that the mathematical structures of self-organization and of decision making
are identical. In other words, the process of self-organization corresponds to an endogenous
decision making process, giving the impression that a superior intention is at work. While
this view point has been made many times by philosophers of the science of complexity, for
instance, by Hooker et al. (2011) (and references therein), we provide, what we think, is the
first strict mathematical formulation of this equivalence. By recognizing the endogenous nature
of decision making that is embedded in any self-organization process, we clarify the meaning of
intention and will, which are possessed by the complex system itself. While this has important
philosophical implications, the main characteristic of our approach is a rigorous mathematical
framework, whose precise language permits the demonstration of the proposed equivalence.
As any endeavor touching such big concepts and existential questions, there are many roots
and precursors of our ideas, going back to Plato and Aristotle, Saint Anselm around 1000 AD
and Kant. Perhaps the idea closest to our proposition is the one formulated by the German
philosopher Kant. In 1790, in his Kritik der Urteilskraft, whose translation can be found in
(Kant, 2007), he introduced the term “self-organization”. He argued that it is possible for an
entity to exist, whose parts or organs are simultaneously ends and means. Such a system of
organs must be able to behave as if it has a mind of its own, that is, it is capable of governing
itself. This idea can be understood as if a system could decide on the process of self-organization.
In other words, understood from the theme we propose here, self-organization can be interpreted
as the process of decision making performed by a complex system. And reciprocally, decision
making can be treated as the process of self-organization of the information by humans in the
process of knowledge gathering (Poerksen 2003; von Foerster 2003). The idea of the similarity
between statistical systems and game-theory forms (Galam and Walliser 2010) is a particular
example of the approach we follow in the present article.
We prove the general proposition of the similarity between self-organization and decision
making by developing an explicit mathematical formulation describing these processes in the
frame of the same general probabilistic approach. Necessarily, such an approach has to be
probabilistic for two reasons. First, a probabilistic approach is mathematically more general,
including the deterministic one as a particular case. Second, observed processes in nature are
practically always stochastic, and therefore require a probabilistic description. A system can
often be in several macroscopic states, or several different structures can be formed. Which
of the states is mostly occupied, or which structure prevails, is defined by the corresponding
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probability distributions, which in full generality are also path or history dependent. Although,
under the same conditions, one of the structures, or patterns, can be preferable and be more
often realized, other types of structures can also occur, though with a smaller probability or
weaker frequency.
Armed with the notion that the description of any system requires a probabilistic framework,
we can now give a first intuition of the correspondence between the processes of self-organization
and decision making, which can be described in the frame of the same mathematical framework
with just a slight change of terminology. Respectively, both processes can be defined in similar
words:
Self-organization is the process of evaluating the probabilities of system states in the search for
the most stable state.
Decision making is the process of evaluating the probabilities of decision prospects in the search
for the most preferable prospect.
We start Sec. 2 by explaining the intimate connection between the notions of stability and
of probability, so that the system state is more probable, provided it is more stable. Then
we give the general scheme outlining the analogies between the system states and decision
prospects in the frame of the probabilistic representation. The principle of minimal information,
described in Sec. 3, serves as a basic tool for defining the explicit forms of the state or prospect
probabilities. Section 4 illustrates the general approach by particular examples of many-body, or
multi-agent, systems, including large and small statistical assemblies, systems with mesoscopic
fluctuations, and social and biological systems. The dynamics of self-organization in strongly
out-of-equilibrium systems is described in Sec. 5, where the probabilities of structure formation
are shown to be defined by the system expansion exponents. An illustration of the use of
the expansion exponents for the description of the structures arising under turbulent photon
filamentation is given. The reformulation of decision making in probabilistic terms, which
makes it analogous to self-organization, is presented in Sec. 6 for both classical and quantum
variants. Section 7 concludes.
We would like to stress that our main aim is not to analyze in detail the behavior of
particular systems, but to show that their final mathematical description can be realized in the
same general probabilistic framework. Particular examples that we mention for illustration can
be already well understood. This does not impact the fact that the principal novelty of our
article is the demonstration in mathematical terms that the general features of self-organization
in any complex system are formally equivalent to the process of decision making by alive beings.
2 System states as decision prospects
The possibility of characterizing (i) the states of empirical systems as decision prospects and (ii)
transitions between the states as if the system would be deliberating choosing the most stable,
that is, the most preferable state, relies on the fact that observation and knowledge acquisition
always require the existence of an observer. In the process of describing and characterizing the
system of interest, the observer ascribes to the system a kind of reasoning typical of a decision
maker endowed with intentions (von Glasserfeld 1991, 1996; von Foerster 1999, 2003).
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2.1 Relation between stability and probability
Any complex system, under given external conditions, tends to occupy the most stable state.
At the same time, the available states can be classified by their probabilities, so that the
more stable state enjoys the higher probability. This relation between stability and probability
is widely acknowledged for stationary systems that can be characterized by thermodynamic
potentials, as can be inferred from textbooks on statistical physics (Khinchin 1949; Landau and
Lifshitz 1980; Yukalov and Shumovsky 1990; Sornette 2006). The choice of a thermodynamic
potential depends on the accepted thermodynamic variables. For instance, if one deals with the
free energy F , then the system stability requires the realization of the free energy minimum.
And the probability of a system to possess this free energy is written as p ∝ e−βF , hence the
minimization of free energy is equivalent to the maximization of probability. It is admissible
to accept the entropy S as a thermodynamic potential. Then the system stability requires
the maximization of the system entropy. At the same time, the system probability reads as
p ∝ eS. Therefore, the larger entropy corresponds to the higher probability. In Sec. 5 below, we
demonstrate that the same relation between stability and probability holds for nonequilibrium
systems as well. For the latter systems, the higher stability is characterized by the smaller map
multiplier, thus, by the larger probability that is inversely proportional to this map multiplier.
In summary, for all systems, the most stable state is the most probable one.
2.2 Self-organization as search for the most preferable state
A complex system can be in several macrostates corresponding to different levels of self-
organization. The macrostates can be distinguished, e.g., by their order parameters (Landau
and Lifshitz 1980; Yukalov and Shumovsky 1990; Sornette 2006) or by their order indices (Cole-
man and Yukalov 2000; Yukalov 2002). Let us denote such macrostates as pij , enumerating them
by the index j = 1, 2, . . . , L. The total set of admissible states is denoted as
L = {pij : j = 1, 2, . . . , L} . (1)
The main assumption is that each state pij can be characterized by the related probability
p(pij) satisfying the standard properties
L∑
j=1
p(pij) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(pij) ≤ 1 . (2)
For a while, we assume that such a probability measure can be defined. And the method of
constructing the corresponding probabilities will be given in the following section.
Here, the index j, enumerating the macrostates, is taken to be discrete. The case of a
continuous index can be treated in the same manner, just replacing summation by integration.
The set of all states can be ordered according to relations between the corresponding prob-
abilities. The state pi1 is said to be preferred to the state pi2 if and only if
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (pi1 > pi2) . (3)
The states pi1 and pi2 are equivalent if and only if
p(pi1) = p(pi2) (pi1 = pi2) . (4)
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And the state pi1 is preferred or indifferent to pi2 when
p(pi1) ≥ p(pi2) (pi1 ≥ pi2) . (5)
Comparing the states by using their probabilities makes it possible to define the least pre-
ferred and the most preferred states, which makes the set (1) a complete lattice. An optimal
state pi∗ is the state possessing the largest probability:
p(pi∗) ≡ sup
j
p(pij) . (6)
A self-organizing complex system behaves as if it would evaluate, by means of fluctuations,
the probabilities of available macrostates, selecting from them the optimal state. This is anal-
ogous to the behavior of a decision maker who chooses, by deliberation, among a set of given
alternatives, the optimal prospect.
2.3 Measures of system self-organization
To define the level of self-organization, one usually considers the Shannon entropy
S ≡ −
L∑
j=1
p(pij) ln p(pij) , (7)
which is a positive quantity characterizing missing information (Shannon and Weaver 1949).
Respectively, the Shannon information is minus the Shannon entropy,
IS ≡
L∑
j=1
p(pij) ln p(pij) . (8)
The latter quantity, describing missing information, is negative. The larger the system entropy,
that is, the smaller the Shannon information, the lesser the system self-organization.
Another measure of self-organization is the von Foerster redundancy
R ≡ 1 − S
Smax
, (9)
in which Smax is the maximal value of entropy (von Foerster 1995; Pask 1996). The Shannon
entropy (7) is maximal for the uniform probabilities p(pij) = 1/L, when Smax = lnL. The larger
the redundancy, the higher the level of the system self-organization.
According to von Foerster, when the system is certainly in a fixed state pif , such that
p(pij) = δjf then it is perfectly organized, with R = 1, S = 0. On the contrary, for the uniform
distribution p(pij) = 1/L, the system is not organized, with R = 0, S = lnL.
A convenient measure is the Kullback-Leibler (1951, 1959) relative information
IKL ≡
L∑
j=1
p(pij) ln
p(pij)
p0(pij)
, (10)
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where p0(pij) is a representative of an approximate, or trial, probability measure, based on the
available additional information on the system, and satisfying the standard conditions
L∑
j=1
p0(pij) = 1 , 0 ≤ p0(pij) ≤ 1 . (11)
The Kullback-Leibler relative information, also called negentropy, is non-negative defined:
IKL ≥ 0 . (12)
This follows from the Gibbs-Klein (Gibbs 1902; Klein 1931) inequality∑
j
p(pij) ln
p(pij)
p0(pij)
≥
∑
j
[p(pij)− p0(pij)] = 1− 1 = 0 . (13)
The relative information is minimal when p0(pij) and p(pij) coincide,
IKL = 0 , p0(pij) = p(pij) . (14)
In the case of the uniform trial distribution p0(pij), the Kullback-Leibler relative information
and Shannon information are connected by the equality
IKL = IS + lnL , p0(pij) =
1
L
. (15)
The form of the Kullback-Leibler information is similar to the expected log-likelihood func-
tion employed in statistics (Edwards 1972). The information measures are important for con-
structing the information functional that makes it possible to define the state probabilities for
the considered complex systems.
3 Principle of minimal information
A pivotal role for defining the explicit form of the state probabilities is played by the principle
of minimal information implying the minimization of an information functional. The origin of
this principle is the maximization of entropy under given conditions (Gibbs 1902, 1928, 1931;
Shannon and Weaver 1949; Janes 1957). The minimization principle defines the most accurate
distribution under the minimal available information on the considered system.
3.1 Minimization of the information functional
To define an information functional, one has, first, to introduce the representative ensemble,
which is a pair {L, p}, where p implies the probability set
p→ {p(pij) : pij ∈ L; j = 1, 2, . . . , L} ,
which is complemented by the available additional constraints making unique the system de-
scription (Gibbs 1928, 1931; Yukalov 1991, 2007). Such constraints are formulated as statistical
averages, or expected values, of constraint functions:
Cα =
∑
j
p(pij)Cα(pij) , (16)
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with the index α = 1, 2, . . . enumerating the constraints. Then, the information functional can
be written as
I[p] =
∑
j
p(pij) ln
p(pij)
p0(pij)
+ λ0
[∑
j
p(pij)− 1
]
+
+
∑
α
λα
[∑
j
p(pij)Cα(pij)− Cα
]
, (17)
where λ0 and λα are Lagrange multipliers guaranteeing the validity of constraints (16).
The information functional is the sum of the Kullback-Leibler information measure and of
those constraints that have been imposed on the system.
The minimization of the information functional assumes the variational conditions
δI[p]
δp(pij)
= 0 ,
δ2I[p]
δp(pij)2
> 0 . (18)
Introducing the global constraint
C(pij) ≡
∑
α
λαCα(pij) , (19)
this results in the state probability
p(pij) =
p0(pij)
Z
exp{−βC(pij)} , (20)
in which the normalization quantity
Z =
∑
j
p0(pij) exp{−βC(pij)}
is called partition function. The parameter β is a Lagrange multiplier.
The meaning of the principle of minimal information is in characterizing the probability
distribution under the minimal information encoded in the statistical constraints. By specifying
these constraints for concrete systems, one gets particular forms of the probability distribution.
3.2 Minimization of the grand potential
It may happen that the probabilities (20) depend on some additional set of parameters w →
{wj}, so that the state probability is
p(pij , w) =
p0(pij , w)
Z(w)
exp{−βC(pij , w)} , (21)
with the partition function
Z(w) =
∑
j
p0(pij, w) exp{−βC(pij , w)} .
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Substituting this into the information functional (17) yields
I[p, w] = − lnZ(w)− C , (22)
with a fixed global constraint
C ≡
∑
α
λαCα .
Since the latter is fixed, the minimization of the information functional with respect to the
parameter set w is equivalent to the maximization of the partition function:
min
w
I[p, w]←→ max
w
Z(w) . (23)
We can introduce the grand potential
Ω(w) ≡ − 1
β
lnZ(w) . (24)
In a thermodynamical system, 1/β plays the role of temperature T . More generally, T plays
the role of a parameter measuring the level of noise. Then, from Eq. (23), it follows (Yukalov
2011) that the minimization of the information functional is equivalent to the minimization of
the grand potential:
min
w
I[p, w]←→ min
w
Ω(w) . (25)
The above formalism applies beyond the description of thermodynamical systems at or close
to equilibrium, also to quasi-equilibrium systems, when the notion of temperature is replaced
by its more generalized version 1/β giving a measure of the typical strength of the fluctuations
of the system variables. As important practical applications, it is possible to enumerate a num-
ber of heterogenous condensed-matter systems displaying mesoscopic heterophase fluctuations
(Yukalov 1981, 1991, 2003a; Shumovsky and Yukalov 1982). Then the parametric set {wj},
normalized in the usual way, ∑
j
wj = 1 , 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1 ,
characterizes the statistical weights wj of qualitatively different mesoscopic fluctuations.
4 Quasi-stationary self-organizing systems
When the system parameters vary much slower than typical dynamical motions in the system,
the latter can be treated as quasi-stationary. The principle of minimal information is often
applied for describing self-organization in such quasi-stationary systems. Below we give a brief
reminder of the known examples of various statistical systems, stressing the main idea that the
systems of quite different nature can be described in a general probabilistic way.
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4.1 Probability of thermodynamic states
Statistical systems, to which thermodynamics is applicable, are characterized by thermody-
namic potentials, such as the free energy (Landau and Lifshitz 1980). Suppose that the system
can acquire several thermodynamic states pij , corresponding to different thermodynamic phases
specified by different order parameters and the related symmetry (Landau and Lifshitz 1980;
Yukalov and Shumovsky 1990; Coleman and Yukalov 2000; Sornette 2006). For each such a
state, one can define a thermodynamic potential, for concreteness, the free energy F (pij). Then,
as a constraint (16), it is natural to take the expected value
F =
∑
j
p(pij)F (pij) . (26)
Assuming the uniform trial distribution p0(pij) = 1/L, the principle of minimal information
gives
p(pij) =
1
Z
exp{−βF (pij)} , (27)
with the partition function
Z =
∑
j
exp{−βF (pij)} .
Here β is a Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the inverse temperature T = 1/β.
Distribution p(pij) describes the probability that the thermodynamic system is in the state
pij . The sharpness of the distribution depends on the system size.
4.2 Infinite statistical systems
The typical situation for the so-called bulk statistical systems, such as condensed matter or
gases, is to consider their large sizes by taking the thermodynamic limit, when the number of
particles N composing the system is assumed to tend to infinity. In that case, the free energy,
being an extensive quantity, tends to infinity as F (pij) ∝ N → ∞. Therefore the probability
(27) becomes sharply centered at the optimal state pi∗,
p(pij) =
{
1, pij = pi∗
0, pij 6= pi∗ , (28)
whose order parameter provides the minimal free energy of the system,
F (pi∗) = min
j
F (pij) . (29)
Let some of the characteristic system parameters, either external or internal, be varying. For
instance, this can be temperature. For any given governing parameter, such as temperature, the
system always chooses the optimal state, as described above. As an illustration, let us vary the
temperature and let there exist two different states, corresponding to different thermodynamic
phases. Then, there can exist a critical temperature at which the following transition occurs,
p(pi1) = 1 (T < Tc) ,
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p(pi2) = 1 (T > Tc) , (30)
which is called phase transition.
Since varying the governing parameters does not usually directly impose neither the type
of the order parameter nor the related symmetry, but the system itself acquires the structure
and symmetry of the optimal state, this process is termed self-organization. As far as the
system takes the optimal state with probability one, the process of self-organization for an
infinite system is of the deterministic type. Counter examples are provided by spin glasses
and other so-called ill-condensed systems, which exhibit the coexistence of exponentially many
probabilistically almost equivalent states even in the thermodynamic limit (Me´zard et al. 1986).
4.3 Finite statistical systems
There exists a large class of systems that contain many particles, in that sense being statistical,
but at the same time, with the number of particles being finite, such that finite-size effects
become important. Examples are trapped atoms, quantum dots, atomic nuclei, metallic grains,
and spin assemblies, as well as biological molecular structures (Birman et al. 2013).
When the system is finite, with a finite number N of particles, then several macroscopic
states can be realized, having nontrivial probabilities (27). In such a case, the phase transition
between two different phases occurs with the characteristics that the state probabilities are not
exactly one or zero, as for infinite statistical systems. The transition now is characterized by
the reversion of the inequality
p(pi1) > p(pi2) (T < Tc) (31)
to the inequality
p(pi1) < p(pi2) (T > Tc) . (32)
The transition can be discontinuous or continuous. In any case, this corresponds to a proba-
bilistic self-organization associated with phase transitions (Bouchaud and Georges 1990; Jona-
Lasinio 2001).
As physical illustrations of finite systems with coexisting phases, we can mention metallic
grains that can be either in superconducting or normal states (von Delft 2001), atomic nuclei
that can take different shapes (Gaudefroy et al. 2009), and nanosize spin clusters that can be
either in magnetic or non-magnetic states (Bansmann et al. 2005).
4.4 Financial and social systems
The methods of statistical physics and thermodynamics have been widely used for economic,
financial, and social systems, as can be inferred from the reviews (Baumga¨rnter 2004; Smith
and Foley 2008; Castellano et al. 2009; Yakovenko and Rosser 2009). A statistical description,
characterized by the probabilities of type (20), has been employed for various financial and
social systems, with different quantities playing the role of constraints Cα(pij). Foley (1994,
1996) applied such a probability distribution for financial markets, treating the constraints as
market transactions of different agents and using the term market temperature. The transaction
values can be measured in money units (Yakovenko and Rosser 2009; Kusmartsev 2011). Mar-
ket crashes can be associated with phase transitions (Sornette 2003; McCauley 2003; Marsili
11
2009). As market energy, or disagreement function, one often uses Hamiltonians of spin systems
(Chowdhury and Stauffer 1999; Zhou and Sornette 2007; Stauffer 2008; Harras and Sornette,
2011). In applications to social systems, one uses a constraint that is equivalent to the system
energy and is called system frustration, or conflict (Galam and Moscovici 1991; Galam 1996;
Florian and Galam 2000; Gallo et al. 2009).
Markets or social groups are, certainly, finite systems, hence, they can be characterized by
the distributions of type (27). The free energy for financial systems can be defined (Smith and
Foley 2008) as “an intrinsic money-metric welfare measure of the allocation of an economy in
contact with a reservoir”.
Extending the definition of free energy to social systems, one defines it in the following way.
The system energy E(pij) of a state pij can be termed the state cost. The society temperature
T has the meaning of the intensity of noise produced by the surrounding playing the role of a
thermostat. The noise energy, or the cost of noise for a system in a state pij , is given by the
quantity TS(pij), where S(pij) is the entropy of the state pij. Then, the free energy, or free cost,
is the intrinsic cost of a state, that is, the cost of the state without the cost of noise:
F (pij) = E(pij)− TS(pij) . (33)
Being a finite system, a society cannot be in a single pure state, but always possesses finite
probabilities of being in different states. Phase transitions occur from one dominant state to
another, as is described in Sec. 4.3. Continuous transitions correspond to fast evolutions, while
discontinuous transitions are associated with revolutions or abrupt regime shifts.
4.5 Biological and ecological systems
For biological and ecological systems, pij can correspond to a type of species characterized
by fitness w(pij). The intensity of external noise is described by selection temperature T . As
constraint (16), one defines the average fitness
W =
∑
j
p(pij)w(pij) . (34)
Then, from the principle of minimal information of Sec. 3, one finds the distribution called the
relative reproduction rate
p(pij) =
1
Z
exp{βw(pij)} . (35)
This exponential form of the reproduction rate is often used in the biological literature (Manly
1976; Crozier and Pamilo 1979; Russell 1996; Arias et al. 2001; Cowperthwaite et al. 2005;
Martin and Lenormand 2008; Saakian et al. 2010). Expression (35) shows that, among a
variety of different species, the one with highest fitness enjoys the higher reproduction rate.
The goal of this section has been the demonstration of the main idea that rather differ-
ent systems can be described in a general probabilistic way enjoying the same mathematical
characterization.
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5 Self-organization in dynamical systems
In dynamical systems, self-organization is usually accompanied by the appearance of spatial
structures or patterns (Glansdorff and Prigogine 1971; Haken 1983, 2005; Nicolis 1986) or it
is connected with critical transitions (Kuehn 2011) when the system behavior changes qual-
itatively. The process of self-organization in dynamical systems can also be formulated in a
probabilistic framework (Yukalov 2001a, 2001b, 2003b).
The main message of the present section is twofold. First, we demonstrate that nonequilib-
rium systems, similarly to equilibrium ones, can be characterized by probabilities derived from
the principle of minimal information, that is, from conditional entropy maximization. Second,
we prove that the notion of stability is directly connected to that of probability. The more
stable state is described by the smaller map multiplier and by the larger probability.
5.1 Probabilistic pattern selection
Suppose a dynamical system can acquire several different spatial structures, with the type of
the j-th structure being denoted by pij . To make the description of the probabilistic approach
transparent, let us consider a one-dimensional dynamical system, whose evolution is given by
the equation
d
dt
y(pij, t) = v(pij, t) , (36)
where y(pij, t) represents an observable quantity. A generalization to dynamical systems of any
dimensionality is straightforward (Yukalov 2001a, 2001b, 2003b).
Self-organization of a dynamical system can be interpreted as the system search for stability.
The latter is characterized by the map multipliers
µ(pij , t) ≡ δy(pij, t)
δy(pij, 0)
. (37)
If |µ(pij, t)| < 1, the structure pij is locally stable at time t. When |µ(pij, t)| = 1, the structure
is locally neutral, and when |µ(pij, t)| > 1, the structure is locally unstable. The map multiplier
can be expressed through the Jacobian
J(pij , t) ≡ δv(pij , t)
δy(pij, t)
(38)
in the form
µ(pij , t) = exp
{∫ t
0
J(pij , t
′) dt′
}
. (39)
It is convenient to introduce the expansion exponents
X(pij , t) ≡ ln |µ(pij, t)| . (40)
These exponents show how quickly a deviation from an initial condition varies in time, either
converging to or diverging from this initial condition according to the relation
|δy(pij, t)| = |δy(pij, 0)| exp{X(pij , t)} .
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The expansion exponent is connected with the Jacobian by the equation
X(pij , t) = Re
∫ t
0
J(pij, t
′) dt′ . (41)
Our aim is to find an expression for the structure probability p(pij , t) that should satisfy the
standard normalization condition∑
j
p(pij , t) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(pij , t) ≤ 1 , (42)
at each moment of time. Following the general prescription of Sec. 3, we define the information
functional
I[p] =
∑
j
p(pij , t) ln
p(pij , t)
p0(pij , t)
+ λ0
[∑
j
p(pij, t)− 1
]
. (43)
By the assumption that the system searches for the most stable structure, the trial distribution
p0(pij , t) can be taken to be inversely proportional to the modulus of the map multiplier |µ(pij, t)|.
Then, from the principle of minimal information, we get the structure probability
p(pij , t) =
1
Z(t)|µ(pij, t)| , (44)
with the partition function
Z(t) =
∑
j
1
|µ(pij , t)| .
In view of relation (40), the structure probability can be expressed through the expansion
exponent as
p(pij , t) =
exp{−X(pij , t)}
Z(t)
, (45)
where the partition function is
Z(t) =
∑
j
exp{−X(pij , t)} .
Thus, the dynamical system, in general, can exhibit different structures, with the corre-
sponding probabilities (45). The system tries to self-organize acquiring the most stable struc-
ture. At the same time, other less stable structures are also admissible, though with lower
probabilities. Between two structures at the given moment of time, the structure that is more
probable is the one which is more stable and whose expansion exponent is smaller. This can
be called the principle of minimal expansion. This approach can be employed for any dynam-
ical system. Time series, met in various empirical data, can be represented as trajectories of
dynamical systems. Therefore, the approach of pattern selection can be applied to different
time series as well, e.g., to time series that are commonly found for financial markets (Yukalov
2001c).
The importance of the present section is the direct demonstration of the intimate relation
between stability and probability for nonequilibrium systems. The most stable state is the most
probable.
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5.2 Turbulent photon filamentation
In order to show that the results of the previous section provide a practical tool for treating
concrete nonequilibrium systems, let us consider the effect of turbulent photon filamentation.
This is the phenomenon in which an assembly of resonant atoms inside a cylindrical sample
spontaneously separates into many thin radiating filaments that are randomly distributed in
the sample cross-section (Encinaz-Sanz et al. 2000, Leyva and Guerra 2002). Similar random
structures also arise in passive nonlinear media, such as Kerr media, and in active nonlinear
media, such as photorefractive crystals, pumped by a uniform laser beam (Arecchi et al. 1999).
The microscopic description for a system made of two-level resonant atoms starts with the
Hamiltonian
Hˆ = Hˆa + Hˆf + Hˆaf , (46)
consisting of the atomic Hamiltonian Hˆa, field Hamiltonian Hˆf , and the Hamiltonian of atom-
field interactions, Hˆaf . The atomic Hamiltonian is
Hˆa =
N∑
i=1
ω0
(
1
2
+ Szi
)
, (47)
where N is the number of atoms, ω0 is the atomic transition frequency, and S
z
i is the z -
component of the pseudospin operator of the i-th atom. The field Hamiltonian is
Hˆf =
1
8pi
∫ (
E2 +H2
)
dr , (48)
with electric field E, magnetic field H = ∇ × A, and vector potential A. The atom-field
interaction is given by the Hamiltonian
Hˆaf = − 1
c
N∑
i=1
Ji ·Ai , (49)
in which the short-hand notation Ai ≡ A(ri, t) is used and the transition current has the form
Ji = iω0
(
dS+i − d∗S−i
)
, (50)
where d is the transition dipole and S±i are the ladder operators.
The dynamical system is composed of the evolution equations for the average vector poten-
tial 〈A〉 and the pseudospin averages describing dipole transitions,
ui(t) = 2〈S−i (t)〉 , (51)
coherence intensity
wi(t) ≡ 2
N
∑
j(6=i)
〈S+i (t)S−j (t) + S+j (t)S−i (t)〉 , (52)
and the population difference
si(t) ≡ 2〈Szi (t)〉 . (53)
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The arising filaments can possess different radii rj that correspond to different structures.
Employing the method of Sec. 5.1, it is possible to find (Yukalov 2000, 2001a, 2001b) that the
probability of a filamentary structure with the radius rj has the form
p(rj, t) =
1
Z
exp
{
−Re
∫ t
0
TrJˆ(rj , t
′) dt′
}
,
with
TrJˆ(rj, t) = −γ1 − γ3 − 2γ2[ 1− g(rj)s ] ,
where γ1, γ2, γ3 are the longitudinal, transverse, and dynamical attenuations, respectively, g(rj)
is the effective atomic interaction in the related structure with the filament radius rj, and s is
the average population difference (53) in a filament of that structure.
The maxima of the above probability define the filament radii corresponding to the zeroes
of the integral sine:
Si
(
4pi
√
e
λL
r2j
)
= 0 , (54)
where λ is the radiation wavelength and L is the length of the sample. The optimal radius is
given by the absolute maximum of the structure probability, yielding
r∗ = 0.3
√
λL . (55)
The majority of the arising filaments have this radius (55), although the filaments with
other radii, satisfying Eq. (54), are also present. These theoretical results have been found
to be in very good agreement with experiments (Encinaz-Sanz et al. 2000, Leyva and Guerra
2002).
6 Decision making as self-organization
In the examples treated above, we have shown that practically any system, whether natural,
social, financial, biological or ecological, can be characterized by a probability measure pre-
scribing a weight to each admissible system state or structure. The larger the state probability,
the more stable the system, and the more often the state is realized. The process of self-
organization works as if the system would be searching for the most stable state corresponding
to the largest probability. In the same way, the process of decision making can be interpreted
as self-organization in the decision maker nervous system, when the decision maker is searching
for the most preferable prospect, which thus can be seen as the most stable, characterized by
the largest probability.
6.1 Classical utility theory
Classical decision theory is based on the notion of expected utility (von Neumann and Mor-
genstern 1953; Savage 1954). We briefly recall the basic definitions that will be used in what
follows.
The consequences of actions are measured by outcomes, or payoffs, composing a set
X ≡ {xn ∈ R : n = 1, 2, . . . , Nout} . (56)
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The payoffs can be weighted in different ways, by means of different probability measures
over the set (56), enumerated with the index j = 1, 2, . . . , L, with the probabilities {pj(xn)}
satisfying the standard normalization condition
Nout∑
n=1
pj(xn) = 1 , 0 ≤ pj(xn) ≤ 1 . (57)
A lottery, is the set of payoffs and their weights,
pij = {xn, pj(xn) : n = 1, 2, . . . , Nout} . (58)
One defines the lottery mean
x(pij) ≡ 1
Nout
Nout∑
n=1
xnpj(xn) (59)
and the lottery variance
var(pij) ≡ 1
Nout
Nout∑
n=1
(
x2npj(xn) − [x(pij)]2
)
. (60)
One calls the lottery uncertain when its variance is not zero, and it is certain if the variance
vanishes.
On the set of payoffs, one defines a utility function u(x) : X → R, which is non-decreasing
and concave (Bernoulli 1738). The cardinal expected utility reads as
U(pij) =
Nout∑
n=1
u(xn)pj(xn) . (61)
The expected utility serves as a characteristic of the lottery usefulness.
One says that a lottery pi1 is more useful than pi2, if and only if
U(pi1) > U(pi2) . (62)
Two lotteries are equally useful, when
U(pi1) = U(pi2) . (63)
And a lottery pi1 is not less useful than pi2 if
U(pi1) ≥ U(pi2) . (64)
The action of choosing a lottery under uncertainty is termed a prospect. The prospects are
analogous to the system states considered in Sec. 2. The set (1) of all admissible prospects,
which are ordered according to relations (62) to (63), is termed a lattice. Among all prospects,
there exists the least useful one, pimin, whose expected utility is the smallest:
U(pimin) = min
j
U(pij) . (65)
And there is the most useful prospect pimax, with the largest expected utility:
U(pimax) = max
j
U(pij) . (66)
Because of this, the prospect set corresponding to (58) forms a complete lattice.
In this formulation, classical decision theory is deterministic since a decision maker is sup-
posed to necessarily prefer the most useful prospect.
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6.2 Probabilistic utility theory
The classical normative utility theories as well as different descriptive behavioral utility theo-
ries, such as prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1973; 1980; 1983), are all deterministic,
requiring, with certainty to prefer the prospect characterized by the largest functional quantify-
ing the considered prospects. However, as we show below, decision theory can be reformulated
in probabilistic language.
Our aim is to describe the process of decision making as an intrinsically probabilistic proce-
dure. The first step consists in evaluating consciously and/or subconsciously the probabilities
of choosing different actions from the point of view of their usefulness and/or appeal to the
choosing agent. We transform the above classical deterministic approach to the general prob-
abilistic formulation by assuming that the prospects pij are not fixed, but represent random
variables, so that the prospect lattice is a field of random events (Luce 1958). Respectively, the
expected utility (61) is also a random quantity that can be characterized by a distribution of
prospects f(pij), with the usual normalization condition
L∑
j=1
f(pij) = 1 , 0 ≤ f(pij) ≤ 1 . (67)
The weight f(pij) can be called the utility factor, since it describes the usefulness of the prospect
pij . According to this meaning, the usefulness of a prospect with zero utility has to be zero,
which imposes the limiting condition
f(pij)→ 0 , U(pij)→ 0 . (68)
Being a random quantity, the utility U(pij) is assumed to be normalized as
L∑
j=1
f(pij)U(pij) = U . (69)
This practical condition guarantees that the involved lotteries are well defined, having finite
expected utilities.
To find the distribution f(pij), we resort to the principle of minimal information of Sec. 3,
introducing the information functional
I[f ] =
∑
j
f(pij) ln
f(pij)
f0(pij)
+ λ
[∑
j
f(pij)− 1
]
−
− β
[∑
j
f(pij)U(pij)− U
]
, (70)
with the Lagrange multipliers λ and β taking into account conditions (67) and (69). To satisfy
condition (68), the trial distribution f0(pij) can be defined as the likelihood ratio proportional
to U(pij)/U(pimax). Then the minimization of the information functional leads to the utility
factor
f(pij) =
U(pij)
Z
exp{βU(pij)} , (71)
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with the partition function
Z =
∑
j
U(pij) exp{βU(pij)} .
Note that the utility factor specified by (71) satisfies the limiting condition (68).
A probabilistic representation of decisions is not new, since it is at the core of classical choice
theory (Anderson et al. 1992). Classical choice theory assumes that the probability to choose
between different alternatives can be written similarly to expression (71) but without the U(pij)
prefactor, which is called the logit rule (McFadden 1974). While similar (in particular with the
use of entropy arguments), our formulation is essentially different from the logit rule and this
difference results from the specification (68).
The Lagrange multiplier β plays the role of a parameter capturing the level of confidence
or belief in selecting the prospects, hence, β can be called the belief parameter or confidence
parameter. Requiring that the utility factor be an increasing function of utility makes the belief
parameter non-negative, β ≥ 0. The limiting values of this parameter characterize decision
making in the situations of underconfidence or overconfidence (Griffin and Tversky 1992). In
the particular case of no confidence, we have
f(pij) =
U(pij)∑
j U(pij)
(β = 0) . (72)
In the opposite case of extreme confidence, we get
f(pij) =
{
1, pij = pimax
0, pij 6= pimax (β →∞) . (73)
The latter situation recovers the deterministic formulation of utility theory of Sec. 6.1.
The ordering of prospects by their usefulness can be done by means of the utility factors.
A prospect pi1 is deemed more useful than pi2, if and only if
f(pi1) > f(pi2) . (74)
Two prospects are equally useful when
f(pi1) = f(pi2) . (75)
And a prospect pi1 is not less useful than pi2 if
f(pi1) ≥ f(pi2) . (76)
This ordering is in agreement with that of Sec. 6.1, based on the comparison of expected
utilities.
The application of this approach to time-dependent processes is straightforward. This sim-
ply requires including time dependence into the definition of expected utility by incorporating
in it a temporal discount rate (Samuelson 1937; Loewenstein and Thaler 1989; Frederick et
al. 2002; Rambaud and Torrecillas 2005; Berns et al. 2007). It is also possible to vary the
definition of utility by taking into account the effects of aspiration and adaptation (Selten 1998;
Napel 2003).
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This probabilistic formulation of utility theory puts it in the same frame as the description
of any self-organizing system presented in previous sections. In this framework, the process of
decision making can be understood as the search for the most preferable prospect that enjoys
the largest probability. This can be interpreted as describing the process of self-organization in
the nervous system of the decision maker.
6.3 Behavioral and quantum decision making
Decision theory, based on utility theory, even in the probabilistic variant, characterizes the
objective features of the involved prospects, leaving aside all subjective effects connected with
decision makers. Classical utility theory assumes that decision makers are rational and able to
precisely estimate the corresponding utilities of the considered prospects. This, however, is a
simplification of the real life, where decision makers are always subject to subconscious feelings,
emotions, various biases, prejudices, incentives, anxiety, and intuitive heuristics (Tversky and
Kahneman 1983; Yates and Carlson 1986; Maturana 1988; Shafir et al. 1990; Dixit and Besley
1997; Epstein 2008; West and Grigolini 2010). Variants of decision theory that try to take
account of these subjective effects, typical of the behavior of real decision makers, are studied
in behavioral decision making (Machina 2008, Simon 1959).
Sometimes, one says that realistic decision making contains generic indeterminism (Nichols
2011). Remembering that similar indeterminism is typical of quantum theory, this hints on
the possibility of characterizing behavioral decision making by means of quantum probability
(Lehrer and Shmaya 2006). Actually, Bohr (1933, 1958) was the first to advocate the use of
quantum theory for describing psychological processes. There have been a number of publica-
tions discussing the necessity of invoking quantum probabilities for behavioral decision making
(Lehrer and Shmaya 2006; Danilov and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2008, 2010; Lambert-Mogiliansky
et al. 2009; Photos and Busemeyer 2009). A full quantitative theory introducing quantum
probabilities for behavioral decision making has been developed by the authors (Yukalov and
Sornette 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011). The approach is based on the mathematical the-
ory of quantum measurements, which, as has been noticed by von Neumann (1955), can be
interpreted as a kind of decision theory.
In the present subsection, we wish to emphasize that the probabilistic way of constructing
decision theory can be extended to behavioral decision making taking into account such sub-
jective features as emotions and biases. We shall not go into details of this approach involving
quantum techniques, which can be found in our previous papers (Yukalov and Sornette 2008,
2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011). But we shall only formulate the results.
By construction, quantum theory is probabilistic. The scheme of calculating the prospect
probabilities follows the rules of defining the observable quantities in the quantum theory of
measurement. The space of mind of a decision maker is described by a Hilbert space on
which prospect operators Pˆ (pij) are defined. These operators play the role of the operators
of observables, whose averaging yields the observable quantities corresponding to the prospect
probabilities:
p(pij) ≡ TrρˆPˆ (pij) , (77)
where ρˆ is a statistical trace-one operator characterizing the decision maker, and the trace is
taken over the decision-maker space of mind. The prospect probabilities are normalized as in
condition (2).
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It is straightforward to show that the prospect probability (77) is the sum of two terms:
p(pij) = f(pij) + q(pij) . (78)
The first term corresponds to the utility factor characterizing objective features, while the
second term is due to quantum effects of coherence and interference, which corresponds to
subjective features.
As is known (Zurek 2003), classical theory is a particular case of quantum theory, corre-
sponding to the situation when coherence effects disappear, which is called decoherence. In the
present case, in the same way as for any observable in quantum theory, decoherence implies
the disappearance of the quantum coherence term q(pij). Then, the remaining term f(pij) has
to correspond to the classical utility factor described in the previous subsection. In this way,
classical decision theory is obtained as a limiting case of the quantum decision theory, when
decoherence occurs.
The quantum coherence, or interference, term is what distinguishes quantum prospect prob-
abilities from their classical counterparts. From the point of view of quantum theory, the arising
coherence term can be ascribed to quantum indeterminacy, being contextual. Interpreted in the
contexts of behavioral decision theory, this term can be called attraction factor, characterizing
subjective attitudes of a decision maker to the considered prospects.
Thus, the quantum prospect probability (78) is of dual nature, containing the objective
utility factor f(pij), defined in terms of the prospect utility, and the attraction factor q(pij),
characterizing the subjective attractiveness of the prospect for the decision maker.
Despite the fact that the attraction factor embodies subjective and unconscious components
of the decision making process, it enjoys several quantitative properties making it possible to
give quantitative predictions for the prospect probabilities.
First of all, the attraction factor lies in the interval
− 1 ≤ q(pij) ≤ 1 . (79)
The normalization conditions lead to the alternation property
L∑
j=1
q(pij) = 0 . (80)
And the following average estimate holds:
1
L
L∑
j=1
|q(pij)| = 1
4
. (81)
These properties allow one to make quantitative predictions for aggregate groups of decision
makers, which are found to be in excellent agreement with empirical data, as has been shown in
our previous publications (Yukalov and Sornette 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011), where it has been
demonstrated that all paradoxes of decision making arising from the perspective of classical
utility theory find straightforward resolution in the behavioral quantum approach.
The basic idea of the present subsection is to emphasize two important facts:
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(i) First of all, subjective behavioral phenomena in decision making cannot be described
by minimizing an information functional, whose minimization can provide only the objective
part of the total quantum probability. But taking into account subjective effects requires to
resort to more elaborate techniques of quantum theory. The same, actually, concerns complex
quantum systems, whose description also requires the use of such techniques, but cannot be
fully described by deriving quantum probabilities from an entropy maximization or information
minimization. Thus, these methods are general for defining the probabilities of classical systems,
but are not sufficient for characterizing quantum systems.
(ii) Nevertheless, even quantum systems in nature, as well as subjective effects in decision
making, allow for a unified general procedure of calculating both the state probabilities of
quantum systems as well as the prospect probabilities for behavioral decision makers. In that
way, we see again that there is no principal difference between self-organization of complex
systems, including quantum, and the process of human decision making, even subject to be-
havioral biases and emotional feelings. Behavioral effects of decision makers can be interpreted
as analogous to quantum fluctuations in natural systems.
According to the behavioral interpretation of quantum decision theory (Yukalov and Sor-
nette 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011), the process of decision making goes through the following
steps. One fixes a set of prospects, then evaluates their utility and attractiveness, resulting in
the evaluation of the prospect probabilities, and from their comparison, one defines the optimal
prospect. This scheme can be formalized by the sequence
{pij} → {p(pij)} → p(pi∗) . (82)
But the same sequence is typical of self-organization of any system. It is just a matter of
terminology, whether one talks of decision prospects or system states. Decision making and self-
organization are the same processes, sometimes occurring in different systems and often times
happening in the same system as self-organization of the nervous system during the decision
process of a human being.
7 Summary
Self-organization in different systems is described as a process of evaluation of the state proba-
bilities in the search for the most stable state, hence for the state with the largest probability.
Natural systems evaluate the admissible states by means of fluctuations. The explicit expression
for the probability distribution follows from the principle of minimal information, implying the
minimization of an information functional. This principle provides the best probability distri-
bution, under the minimal given information on the system. This general scheme is applicable
to systems of any nature, whether statistical, financial, economic, social, or biological. The
probabilistic approach is valid for quasi-equilibrium as well as nonequilibrium systems.
Decision making, formulated in a probabilistic representation, is also a process of evaluating
the prospect probabilities, in the search for an optimal prospect, having the largest probability.
Decision makers evaluate the admissible prospects by deliberations. In classical decision theory,
the prospects are classified as more or less useful according to their expected utilities. In the
behavioral application of quantum decision making, the prospects are evaluated by their utility
as well as by their attractiveness.
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In all cases, the procedure of self-organization is analogous to that of decision making, both
being characterized by the same mathematical scheme. It is only the language that is slightly
different. But there is a direct translation of one language onto another, which is exemplified
in the following dictionary.
Complex system Decision maker
System states Decision prospects
System fluctuations Decision-maker deliberations
State probability Prospect probability
System stability Prospect preferability
Most stable state Most preferable prospect
Quantum fluctuations Behavioral biases
Self-organization Decision making
It is possible to state that self-organization and decision making are equivalent processes.
This conclusion is not merely important from the general descriptive point of view, but it
has far-reaching practical consequences. For instance, these analogies may suggest the way of
creating artificial intelligence (Yukalov and Sornette 2009c).
The processes of self-organization and decision making can be treated from two different
points of view, complementing each other. First, it is possible to analyze the actual process
of the appearance of structures in a complex system consisting of many agents that are char-
acterized by their typical features and by their interactions with each other as well as with
external fields and perturbations. This requires to consider the dynamical equations of such
multi-agent statistical systems, whether this is a thermodynamic, biological, social system, or
a neuron network in brain.
The second part is the choice of the best way of presenting the results of solving the compli-
cated dynamical systems, allowing for a convenient description and classification of the found
solutions. This final stage is necessary for a clear understanding of the obtained results and for
their correct interpretation. Our goal in the present article has been exactly this descriptive
stage.
Our main aim here has been to show that the processes of self-organization in complex
systems and of decision making by alive beings can be represented in the same mathematical
language of the search for the highest probability corresponding to the most stable state or to
the most preferable prospect. Several examples of complex systems that we have mentioned are
already well-known, and we have used them to illustrate that all of them can be described in the
same probabilistic framework. The principal novelty of the present article is the development of
a general probabilistic approach allowing us to describe self-organization and decision making in
the same mathematical terms, thus demonstrating that these two processes can be interpreted
as been identical.
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